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Abstract 
 
In spite of domestic and international political changes, French and German 
foreign policies have displayed high degrees of continuity between the late 
1950s and the mid-1990s. Over the same time period, the directions of the two 
states’ foreign policies have also continued to differ from each other. Why do 
states similar in many respects often part ways in what they want and do? This 
article argues that the French and German national role conceptions (NRCs) ac-
count for both of these continuities. NRCs are domestically shared understand-
ings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social col-
lectivity in the international arena. As internal reference systems, they affect 
national interests and foreign policies. This article reestablishes the NRC con-
cept, empirically codes it for France and Germany for the time period under 
consideration, and demonstrates comparatively how different NRCs lead to 
varying interests and policies across the major policy areas in security, defense, 
and armament. 
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 France and Germany provide the standard example of 
reconciliation between two formerly warring states. Yet, Franco-German 
relations have been simultaneously characterized by reoccurring 
tensions, shaped by often widely diverging definitions of national 
interests and formulations of foreign policies. “Franco-German military 
cooperation in the postwar period,” Philip Gordon finds, “seems to have 
taken place despite important differences in perspective between the two 
countries, not because of a fundamental rapprochement of views.”1 
Further, “at both public and elite levels,” he observes, “French and 
German attitudes toward security and defense were highly different.”2 
And Robert Picht wonders whether French and Germans – 
notwithstanding the tight cooperation between them – speak the same 
(political) language (langage): “It sometimes would seem as if they were 
not living in the same world. Their reference systems are far from being 
identical, the modes of thought, the methods and the postures find the 
same wave length only with difficulty.”3 
 
Between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s, neither France’s nor 
Germany’s basic foreign policy orientation suffered fundamental ruptures 
– irrespective not only of changes in governments, governmental party 
compositions, and leaders on either side of the Rhine, but also the end of 
the Cold War and Germany’s second unification.4 France and Germany 
have much in common: both are wealthy and industrial or post-
industrial; both are stable democracies. Yet they often display critical 
differences in terms of national interest formation and foreign policy-
making. Why do states similar in many respects often part ways in their 
goals and actions? 
 
In this paper I argue that pivotal differences between French and 
German foreign policies stem from fundamentally diverging domestically-
shared views on the role and purpose of their states in the world. I 
conceptualize this internal construction of collective self as “national role 
conceptions” (NRCs). NRCs encapsulate what “we want and what we do 
as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should be,” where the 
“we” represents nation and state as a social collectivity. NRCs are 
character profiles that spark certain interests and policies. Different 
character profiles make different interests and policies intuitive and 
plausible. Their disparate NRCs inform variant French and German 
interests and foreign policies. Their NRCs account for both the overall 
continuity in French and German foreign and security policies, and their 
                                                 
1 Gordon 1995, 11, emphasis added. 
2 Ibid., 9. 
3 Picht 1993, 70. All translations in this paper from French and German into English are 
my own. 
4 For various accounts of this kind of half-century long French and German foreign policy 
continuity see, for example, Gordon 1993; Hoffmann 1964; Hoffmann 2000; Le Gloannec 1997; 
Sauder 1995; Schweigler 1985. 
continued differences. 
 
In order to understand other collectivities’ goals and actions, 
Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, insists that it is necessary to grasp their “self-comprehension” 
(Selbstauffassung)5 or “political self-understanding” (Selbstverständnis).6 
This “self-perception of nations and states” (Eigenwahrnehmung), Wilfried 
von Bredow holds, results from what has formed as history from their 
past.7 Such “history” might come as “the lessons we have learned” or 
“patrimoine.” NRCs cannot be reduced to the interests or ideologies of 
dominant groups, parties, or single persons in or near power, or to the 
organizational features of state and society. They are not the addition or 
the overlapping consensus of individual or group interests. Nor do they 
derive from the imperatives of the anarchic structure of the international 
system. 
 
This paper has three objectives: First, I reestablish NRC as a general 
concept and clarify the effects of different types of NRCs on the 
processes of national interest formation and foreign policy 
formulation. Second, by extracting what is typically taken for granted 
in French and German domestic politics and describing these NRCs’ 
major elements, I show how to code the concept of NRC independently 
from the outcomes to be explained. Third, I demonstrate the value of 
the NRC concept by showing how different NRCs motivate varying se-
curity, defense, and armament interests and policies in the two states. 
Section I addresses conceptual and methodological issues, and 
discusses matters of empirical data collection and coding. Sections II 
and III nominally code the German and French NRCs respectively. 
Section IV assesses NRCs’ analytic leverage by comparatively 
scrutinizing the impact of the French and German NRCs on their 
interests and policies in security, defense, and armament in a fashion 
best named “qualitative regression.” Section V considers NRCs among 
other factors of interest and policy and in relation to other theoretical 
perspectives.8 
                                                 
5 von Weizsäcker 1988, 1161, emphasis added. 
6 von Weizsäcker 1992, 97. 
7 von Bredow 1996. Quote from 112. Others identify a “historically transmitted 
understanding of self” or point to “the image we have about ourselves.” Nonnenmacher 1997; 
Lamers 1998, 185. 
8 The research question and the associated conceptual, theoretical, and empirical aims 
relate this inquiry to four distinct bodies of literature: those of NRCs broadly; French and German 
domestic construction; French and German foreign policy; and NRCs within current IR debates. I 
position my conceptualization of the NRC concept with respect to the first set of literature as I go 
along in Section I. North American NRC work of the 1970s and 1980s, following Holsti’s seminal 
article, has been picked up and continued in Europe over the last two decades. Key works of both 
geographic sources include Gaupp 1983; Holsti 1970; Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 1990; Maull 
1992b; Rosenau 1987; Sampson and Walker 1987; Walker 1987b. I will draw freely on the second 
and third bodies of literature in the empirical Sections II-IV. Aiming to capture the nature and ef-
 
 
I. National Role Conceptions 
NRCs are domestically shared views and understandings regarding the 
proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the 
international arena.9 They are products of history, memory, and 
socialization. They may be contested, but often endure. Coded by an 
empirical distillation of domestically shared elements which together 
make up the role, NRCs are nominal independent variables. They have 
their own vocabulary both expressing and reflecting an NRC, and affect 
interests and policies along three dimensions. They are elements of state 
and national identity. In conceptualizing and analyzing NRCs and their 
effects, I reap benefits by bringing together diverse literatures of different 
origins. I will review NRCs’ various aspects in turn. 
 
Location and Anchoring 
At a minimum, NRCs are shared among national political and 
administrative elites, across a variety of public-organizational units of the 
state, and by the relevant foreign policy community, which encompasses 
advisors, researchers, and academic and journalistic observers. NRCs 
are collectively held.10 Their impact on interests and policies is likely to 
become stronger the more they “become part of the political culture of a 
nation,”11 further shared among societal groups and within civil society. 
Yet, a strong elite consensus might be more consequential than a broad 
but shallow societal agreement. However, given that the distance is 
shortest between national interest formation and policy formulation and 
what is shared among public elites, their advisors, and professional 
observers near the centers of authority, these groups deserve priority 
                                                                                                                                                 
fects of domestic social-cultural institutionalization, my NRC explorations connect to a construc-
tivist research program, and so relate to the sociological-rationalist debate that now constitutes a 
central cleavage in international relations theory. See, for example, Jepperson, Wendt, and Kat-
zenstein 1996; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998; Keohane 1989a; Wæver 1996. In my 
formulation, NRCs share much with other recent “historical-social-cultural inside-out” explana-
tions, which, with conceptual variations, endeavor to grasp the effects of such types of domestic 
institutionalization. For example, John Ruggie’s recent work on U.S. foreign policy focuses on the 
impact of American “self-perception,” an American “sense of self as a nation,” or America’s “sense 
of political community” on U.S. interests and foreign policy making. Ruggie 1998, 200, 201; Rug-
gie 1997, 109. See also Ruggie 1996. Other such explorations include Alastair Iain Johnston’s 
work on Chinese “cultural realism,” Peter Katzenstein’s examination of Japanese security politics, 
and Elizabeth Kier’s analysis of British and French military strategy. Johnston 1995; Johnston 
1996; Katzenstein 1996a; Kier 1997. See further Abdelal 2001; Katzenstein 1996b; Schlichte 
1998. I will return to “NRCs among other theoretical perspectives” in Section V. 
9 This definition both updates and elaborates upon other usages of role conceptions in 
the literature. Thirty years ago, Kal Holsti explicated: “A national role conception includes the poli-
cymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suit-
able to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis 
in the international system or in subordinate systems. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orien-
tations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.” Holsti 1970, 245-246, 
emphasis in the original. 
10 Compare Katzenstein 1996a, 21. On epistemically objective reality, see Searle 1995. 
11 Holsti 1970, 298. 
when researching and coding an NRC. Thus, most research of this and 
similar types, even if working with differing conceptualizations of NRCs, 
has concentrated on “responsible, legitimated decision-makers” acting as 
representatives “of a greater unit, the state,”12 “political elites,”13 or on 
“the highest-level policy makers”14 and their views on “the roles their 
nations should play in international affairs.”15 The core elements of 
France’s and Germany’s NRCs have been broadly shared, well beyond the 
confined circles of public elites and the respective foreign policy 
communities. 
 
Endurance and Contestation 
As shared meaning, NRCs are “historical creations.”16 They are neither 
invariably fixed nor immutable across time. They appear, develop, and 
become dominant during one time period. They may change, decay, or 
recede into history during another time period (and have historically 
done so). Yet, neither are they purely transient phenomena that 
disappear very quickly. Holsti thought of NRCs as a relatively stable 
“attitudinal attribute.”17 These general attitudes often endure. Their 
temporal stability makes NRC a useful analytic concept. France and 
Germany’s NRCs were largely stable between the late 1950s and the mid-
1990s. Major elements of France’s NRC extend a great deal further into 
the past. 
 
NRCs may be politically contested. There may be and have been 
“domestic disputes what one’s role implies, what one’s role is, or who one 
is or should be.”18 Further, NRCs may not always be “clear-cut, orderly, 
logical, or in any other way standardized.”19 Sometimes, there may be 
tensions between an NRC’s different elements. “Role competition occurs,” 
Stephen Walker points out, “when actions taken to honor one 
expectation compete in time and resources with actions necessary to 
meet another expectation.”20 If an NRC is highly contested or if it is not 
clear what it implies, the concept loses analytic value or is useless for the 
given historical situation. However, different strands of NRC literature 
and my own research suggest that NRCs are often fairly robust. And 
                                                 
12 Gaupp 1983, 15. 
13 Wish 1987, 99-102. 
14 Holsti 1970, 256. 
15 Ibid., 235. A social “role” can be split up in an “ego part” (role from within) and an “al-
ter part” (role as ascribed or expected from without, read external social environment). Gaupp 
1983; Kirste and Maull 1996. Regarding NRCs, most research has focused on the “ego part.” 
Whatever the differences or similarities between the psyche of a human individual and shared 
meanings and understandings within a country, the results from research concentrating on the 
inside brings about interesting and useful results. Here, an NRC is a variable coded and operating 
entirely on the domestic level. 
16 Katzenstein 1996a, 22. 
17 Holsti 1970, 254. 
18 Rosenau 1987, 50. 
19 Ibid., 54. 
20 Walker 1987a, 86. 
what springs from one or more NRC elements is frequently apparent. 
During the time period covered here, France’s and Germany’s NRCs were 
little contested. If they were contested, then it was along their fringes, not 
in their core elements. Nor were there generally, as the data show, 
regular tensions among different role elements that would confuse or 
render indeterminate their NRCs’ explanatory value. 
 
Sources of Data and Coding 
In coding France’s and Germany’s NRCs, I have drawn from a wide range 
of empirical sources over the last four decades, including official 
publications and statements, speeches, memoirs of leading statesmen, 
newspaper articles, and diverse accounts from the two states’ foreign 
policy communities. Additionally, I have drawn from secondary French 
and German foreign policy literature from both sides of the North 
Atlantic. The data stem from general foreign policy statements and 
reviews, rather than specific political issues or questions.21 The NRCs on 
which I focus are never tautologically fused with the outcomes they help 
generate, i.e. defined on the basis of what they explain.22 
NRCs are empirically coded nominal variables. They are summary 
labels covering a number of domestically shared elements and 
characteristic terminology of role and purpose.23 These core elements 
and the notions that express and reflect the roles are empirical data 
condensations.24 
 
Effects on National Interest and Foreign Policy 
NRCs affect interests and policies along three dimensions: they prescribe, 
                                                 
21 On this issue, see Holsti 1970, 258. 
22 Holsti identified a population of seventeen NRCs in the international sphere. Holsti 
1970. Others, too, have arrived at ten to twenty basic roles, a number that corresponds to my 
level of generality/specificity. See, for example, appendixes and several contributions in Walker 
1987b. My goal is not to advance role theory, but to describe how domestically-anchored role and 
purpose meanings affect interests and policies. 
NRCs could be broken down into a number of variables, ranging along different dimen-
sions such as active-passive, unilateral-multilateral, or independence-communal foreign policy 
orientations. See, for example, Holsti 1970, 253, 283. Or an NRC could be broken down into its 
(potentially) different guises according to policy area. See Walker 1987b, 265-266 (appendixes). I 
have chosen to code NRC as a nominal variable for each state. This provides explanatory leverage 
with respect to interest formation and foreign policy conduct. 
23 This approach contrasts with the use of the concept in some recent work, where NRCs 
have either been taken as Weberian ideal types or as normative objectives to be strived for. Practi-
tioners of the former formulate NRCs as ideal types from which they derive expectations regarding 
interests and behavior. See Harnisch and Maull 2001; Maull 1992a, 274-275; Maull 1992b, 780; 
Maull 2000. Regarding NRCs as normative goals and policy guides, see Maull 1992a; Schmidt 
1994. The procedure here is “attaching labels” after distilling empirical material. On ideal types 
and real types, compare Weber 1988 (1922). 
24 As practiced below, the respective NRC components and key notions are not intended 
to be a complete description of self-view. They compress some major and consequential elements 
and terms at the core of French and German self-understanding. The full content of each, how-
ever, goes beyond what this style of analysis aims to capture. That implies that other summary-
labeled civilian powers will do some things differently from Germany, and that other residual 
world powers will in their self-understandings be partially incongruent with the French, doing 
some things differently from France. 
proscribe, and induce preferences regarding process and style of policy- 
and decision-making. NRCs have a prescriptive impact in that they 
motivate wills, goals, and actions. Yet NRCs also rule out. Putting them 
outside realistic consideration, they make interests and policy options 
intuitively implausible, categorically exclude them as wrong or 
unacceptable, or make them unthinkable. These are NRCs’ proscriptive 
effects. NRCs often are powerful tools to predict what actors will not want 
and not do and will not consider optional or feasible. They proscribe as 
much as they prescribe. Finally, NRCs influence interests for a certain 
processual style of foreign policy-making. This includes the entire pro-
cedural range of fixing positions and formulating policies, both within the 
national government and with governments of other states.25 
 
Often, interests and policies that derive from NRCs are viewed as 
normal, right, and intuitively plausible within the respective country. 
From another NRC’s perspective, quite different interests and policies 
may be normal, right, and plausible. For Germany, renouncing nuclear 
weapons has been normal and right. For France, possession and control 
of an independent national nuclear striking force is equally intuitive and 
right. 
 
Although most studies that have employed NRCs as an 
independent variable have sought to analyze phenomena having to do 
with foreign policy, they have not been congruent regarding “the thing to 
be explained.”26 Commonly, NRCs somehow relate to endogenizing 
interests.27 My distinction among the three pathways with which NRCs 
affect national interests and foreign policies unifies and standardizes the 
outcome-to-be-explained. 
 
Origins 
NRCs are intersubjective products of history, memory, and socialization. 
On a historical-empirical plane, systematizing research on NRCs’ origins 
would entail the detailed tracing of the roots and emergence of various 
NRCs and their elements. Conducted most thoroughly, such studies 
might yield editions as monumental as Pierre Nora’s Lieux de Mémoire on 
France.28 On a general theoretical plane, systematizing work on NRCs 
                                                 
25 It is not necessary to overemphasize the differences between prescriptions, proscrip-
tions, and processual dimensions. Sometimes it may be a question of formulation, whether one 
puts the inducement of an interest or policy as the one or the other. For example, whether Ger-
many’s NRC proscribes erratic unilateral policies, or induces a slow and incrementalist proce-
dural style in the formulation of a certain policy may in the first place be semantic. In other in-
stances, however, only one of the three dimensions will be adequate. In any case, drawing the 
distinction helps to bring order to arguments about NRCs’ causal effects. 
26 Holsti 1970, 305. Explananda include goals, motives, interests, strategies, appropriate 
foreign policy means, instruments, decisions, behavior, and foreign policy action patterns. See 
Gaupp 1983, 15; Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 1990; Maull 1992b; Rosenau 1987; Sampson and 
Walker 1987; Walker 1987a. 
27 See Kirste and Maull 1996, 285-290. 
28 Nora 1997 (1984-1992). 
would require a theory to explain when historical experiences do and do 
not translate into NRC components, as well as why some roles emerge 
while other conceivable roles do not.29 Both kinds of inquiry on NRCs’ 
origins are beyond the scope of this article. There surely are profound 
historical forces that account for the significant disparity between the 
two large Carolingian heirs’ NRCs. Key is that French and Germans have 
different historical reference points in thinking about themselves and 
their foreign policy roles.30 
 
In the German case, the historical legacies of the Second World 
War and the Holocaust, with the conception of a democratic Germany as 
a counter-design to the barbaric regime of the Third Reich, are 
constitutive.31 Perhaps it is trivial to state that two disastrous World 
Wars, the moral devastation of the Holocaust, trench warfare, scorched 
earth, mass slaughterings, lots of barbed wire, and a wall with a death 
strip and a death toll have left their traces in Germany’s collective 
psyche. It is also true. “Historical legacies,” Gebhard Schweigler remarks, 
“unlike personal inheritances, cannot simply be rejected if the terms 
appear disadvantageous.”32 
 
France’s historical reference points differ fundamentally. Here, it is 
the indivisible model-republic, the first nation with a grande armée, 
prime among European armies for some two hundred years between the 
mid-seventeenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries, conquering and 
ordering Europe, and bringing to it a civil code and Cartesian clarity. It is 
a self-view of a collectivity always at the forefront of political, social, 
scientific, and cultural progress and sophistication. And, very 
importantly, it is a collectivity about which General de Gaulle success-
fully invited his fellow citizens to think “in a certain way.”33 
Contemporary French conceptions of the state and the nation date back 
at least to the early and late eighteenth century, respectively.34 
 
II. Germany as a Civilian Power 
Summarizing its core components and associated vocabulary, I label the 
German NRC “civilian power.” Broadly, a “civilian power is a state whose 
foreign policy role conception and role behavior are tied to goals, values, 
principles, as well as forms of exerting influence and instruments of 
                                                 
29 For attempts along such lines, see, for example, Naomi Bailin Wish, who discusses dif-
ferent NRC sources and offers a “two-stage, national attribute-role conception model.” Wish 1987, 
quote from 102. Sampson and Walker correlate broad social and societal domestic cultural 
norms, especially organizational norms, with NRCs. Sampson and Walker 1987. And Maull ex-
plores the societal and domestic conditions for the development of the role conception “civilian 
power.” Maull 1992b, 781-782. 
30 Compare Grosser 1983, 31. 
31 For the same view with different emphases, see Banchoff 1996; Berger 1998; 
Schweigler 1996; Zifonun 1997. 
32 Schweigler 1996, 8. 
33 de Gaulle 1954, 5. 
34 See, for example, Rémond 1982; Sauder 1995, chapters 7 and 8. 
exercising power, that serve to civilize international relations.”35 Central 
German NRC components include (1) “never on our own”; (2) promotion 
of an increasingly precise legal framing of international relations and 
support for broadening the legitimacy of the international order; and (3) a 
generally restrictive attitude toward the use of military force, particularly 
by single states. Standard German foreign policy notions comprise 
responsibility, predictability, reliability (Verantwortung, Berechenbarkeit, 
Zuverlässigkeit). During the period covered, Germany’s was a foreign 
policy discourse with little disagreement on essentials. 
 
Core Components 
“Never On Our Own.” This is the first core element of the creed that 
Germany has cultivated as its self-view. It is the shared propensity 
toward a broad international legitimization of all important foreign policy, 
especially in security affairs. It is a general dislike for “going alone” or 
“doing it alone,” a view of unilateralism as unsuitable for oneself: “never 
on our own.”36 “[T]ogether with our friends and partners,” is one 
standard way to state the matter.37 Or, as elaborated programmatically 
by then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, “Only together with our partners, 
not against them, can we win the future.”38 It suits Germany, von 
Weizsäcker stresses, to “evade any type of ‘showing off’ and any unneces-
sary ‘going alone.’”39 Referring to multilateral political structures or 
broad international coalitions, Helga Haftendorn aptly summarizes this 
role-purpose element as Germany’s “self-confident self-integration in 
larger political contexts.”40 
 
Legal Framing, Rule of Law, Regularized Conduct. A second NRC 
component is the belief that it broadly befits Germany to contribute to 
civilizing international affairs by supporting, defending, or advancing the 
legal framing of international affairs, international rule of law, and 
regularized conduct.41 Germany’s is a legalistic culture that not only 
pays much respect to legal stipulations, but accords great legitimacy to 
legally codified procedures and regularized conduct. This NRC 
component is the outward corollary of a norm that has even stronger 
effects for internal political processes. The component applies to both 
global and regional levels, and to the entire range of foreign policy issue 
                                                 
35 Kirste and Maull 1996, 300, emphasis in the original. I should stress that my usage of 
the label “civilian power” exclusively refers to my own coding of it with its compression of com-
ponents and notions. 
36 Schweigler 1996, 16. 
37 For example, Hacke 1996, 4. 
38 Kinkel 1998. 
39 von Weizsäcker 1992, 111. 
40 Haftendorn 1993, 41. 
41 The German terms Verrechtlichung and Verregelung perhaps best grasp the role com-
ponent: “judification”; “rulification.” The section attempts to pin down the shared meaning using 
more common English terminology. 
areas.42 Substantively and processually, this component makes it 
appropriate to formulate one's wants and policies in conformity with 
existing and already codified international rules and legal norms. It also 
animates propensities to further advancing, deepening, and consolidating 
international law and rule as a policy goal in itself.43 Finally, it channels 
interests toward specific international policy issue areas such as human 
rights, the promotion, consolidation, and observance of which flow from 
this role-purpose propensity.44 
 
Military Force as Last Resort toward Non-Selfish Ends. A German “civilian 
power” is not pacifist. But there is great skepticism toward the use of 
force.45 It is a mix of ends, legitimization, and implementation that 
characterizes Germany’s attitude toward military force as the third major 
NRC component. Put briefly: the use of military force might be acceptable 
as last resort toward non-selfish ends, with both means and ends 
necessarily legitimized (strategically, tactically, morally) by a broad 
international coalition that must include Germany’s “partners and 
friends,” ideally under the aegis of an international organization. The 
consensus, Maull spells out, engenders the embracing of primarily non-
military instruments for the achievement of one’s own goals: mediation 
and arbitration, institutionalization, negotiations and compromises that 
might emerge with the help of non-military incentives and sanctions.46 
Still, there might be instances where “civilian powers as the Federal 
Republic might not be able to renounce entirely on military instruments 
for its politics. Yet, special conditions and principles apply for the 
employment of military power. Further, the resort to military means 
fulfills, as opposed to classic power- and security politics, transformed 
functions, and differs in terms of organization and handling.”47 Self-
defense aside, the ends cannot be narrowly national-selfish. There must 
be a broad international consensus on the justifiability of such ends. The 
function of force is to (re)channel the conflict into non-military forms of 
conflict resolution as quickly as possible. As a rule, its handling must be 
legitimized by collective, international decisions that are broadly 
supported.48 
 
Notions: Responsibility, Predictability, Reliability 
There is an entire set of role-purpose-foreign-policy vocabulary. These 
notions express, reflect, and substantiate Germany’s role components. 
Key terms include responsibility, predictability, calculability, reliability, 
stability, accountability, and continuity. 
                                                 
42 See especially Schmidt 1994, 316-317, 322-325. 
43 See Maull 1992a, 272, 276; Maull 1992b, 776. 
44 See, for example, Maull 1992b, 776. 
45 For both, see Kirste and Maull 1996, 303. 
46 Maull 1992b, 778. 
47 Ibid., 785. 
48 Compare Maull 1992a, 273. 
  Standard formulas include that Germany, “due to its history,” has 
a “special (co-)responsibility” for peace (“especially in Europe”), or a 
German “co-responsibility for the world society.”49 Kinkel finds the 
“expectation of our partners” regarding meeting the demands of “our 
European peace responsibility” justified.50 
 
A book-length study on the foundations of German foreign policy 
identifies two related terms that particularly represent broadly shared 
“basic foreign policy orientations.” In the course of the consolidation of 
the old Federal Republic, it finds, “stability” became a value in itself.51 
“The highest value that West German politicians communicate for the 
foreign policy of the Federal Republic is a variant of stability: 
predictability (calculability). West German foreign policy is to be always 
calculable – meaning for all sides always predictable and compre-
hensible.”52 
 
Hans Dietrich Genscher, German foreign minister from 1974 to 
1992, is a particularly important witness. His memoirs center around the 
same relatively small number of key German role and purpose terms: 
responsibility, reliability, continuity (also: partnership, partners and 
friends).53 Frequently, they come in combinations such as “responsibility 
politics/policies” (Verantwortungspolitik), or Germany as a “reliable friend 
and partner as anchor for stability and peace.”54 
 
French observer Daniel Vernet perhaps particularly clearly views 
what seems natural and normal elsewhere, commenting on the German 
governmental change in 1998: “Continuity. Predictability. Reliability. 
There you have the three master words of German foreign policy by the 
future chancellor and his minister.”55 He still perceives a German self-
understanding of “civilian power” motivating German interests and 
policies.56 
 
For a long time, a cardinal term to refer to much of what I have 
distilled above as German NRC components was “continuity.” Stressing, 
citing, pointing out “continuity” based on the “broad consensus” on 
foreign affairs orientations was the magic mantra to condense one’s 
sharing in what I subsume under the shorthand label “civilian power.” 
For four decades, a most diverse set of personalities in a most diverse set 
of political situations has emphasized it: Genscher (and the FDP) as the 
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guarantor of continuity in German foreign policy; Kohl as continuing 
what Adenauer had begun, Brandt extended, and Schmidt consolidated; 
the new red-green government building upon the broad consensus on 
which German foreign policy had rested; and so on. 
 
Discourse Boundaries 
German “foreign policy discourse” in the mid-1990s remained 
characteristic and bounded. Gunther Hellmann identifies five “schools of 
thought” (Denkschulen) and spells out their basic attitudes regarding 
what Germany should strive for internationally, and what would be a 
suitable foreign policy for the country.57 Some varying accentuations 
aside, there are few disagreements in concrete foreign policy issues in 
this discourse among social scientists, political advisors, foreign policy 
decision makers, and opposition politicians.58 Germany’s multilateral 
and broadly integrationist orientation remains particularly strong.59 “The 
(tacit) commonalities among them [these groups] are larger than the 
differences. The consensus among them is broad: there are only different 
emphases.”60 Differences fade when one takes a cross-national 
comparative perspective with other countries-as-collectivities. 
 
Particularly, these groups agree on what German role and purpose 
is not, and what interests do not derive therefrom. For example, none of 
them wants Germany to become more unilateralist, and/or leave NATO, 
and/or acquire its own nuclear striking force. Equally, none holds that 
Germany should become more unilateralist, and/or leave NATO, and/or 
demilitarize, and/or turn pacifist. Germany’s NRC, like any NRC, is also 
the sum of momentous absences. 
 
III. France as a Residual World Power 
For France’s NRC, I use the short-hand label “residual world power.” It 
summarizes the self-view of an active-independent regional leader with 
ambitions of global scale and presence.61 The substance of this NRC’s 
elements differs in kind from Germany’s: (1) “independence,” implying a 
view of self as standing alone, able to make decisions and act in as many 
foreign policy fields as possible without having to count on others; (2) 
“activism,” in terms of shaping and participating in the management of 
international affairs – including the use of military force; and (3) at least 
the potential for global “presence.” Standard reference vocabulary 
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expressing French foreign policy norms include greatness, rank, and 
glory (grandeur, rang, gloire), and a few others like pride, prestige, and 
dignity. One can detect important chunks that became part of the 
“Gaullist consensus” in French history before de Gaulle entered the 
scene to fuse them into a more or less coherent NRC, which has largely 
endured since the General left power. 
 
Core Components 
Independence. This chief element of French self-understanding 
incorporates France’s “full foreign policy independence in the world of 
states.”62 Standing alone, proud, independently as a constituent NRC 
component does not rule out cooperation. But it rules out allowing things 
to take their course, so that at some point the collectivity might have no 
choice but to cooperate with others.63 An “active-independent” role 
conception, Holsti explicates, “emphasizes at once independence, self-
determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to 
extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the 
world.”64 This “set of principles,” Margaret Hermann understands, 
implying the self-perceived “need to remain independent and unaligned,” 
relates to defining interests and policies that help to “make sure (that) all 
bases are covered, that all options are considered so as to insure no loss 
in independent status.”65 A “dogged interest in maintaining their national 
separateness,”66 the independence element includes the “ideal of 
autonomy of decisions.”67 Werner Rouget considers “‘independence’ the 
leading notion” of the Fifth Republic’s foreign policy.68 Whereas as 
French purpose it predates the origins of the Fifth Republic, 
Nonnenmacher reflects that “insisting on independence and autonomy 
has remained a firm dogma of French parties: communists, socialists, 
and Gaullists alike.”69 
 
Activism. Charles de Gaulle crystallizes the activism element in his 
“Memoirs of Hope” where he succinctly rehearses what he considers 
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France’s appropriate role and purpose.70 After sketching the political 
situations in Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, the Third World, the Near 
East, Africa, Asia, Latin America and international institutions after his 
return to power in 1958, de Gaulle stresses: “In each of these areas, I 
want France to play an active part,” elaborating that “it is essential that 
that which we say and do be independent of others.”71 As his entire new 
government and prime minister, he emphasizes, he “was convinced of 
France’s right and duty to act on a world scale.”72 Some four decades 
later, reflecting upon his fourteen years at the Elysée serving François 
Mitterrand, Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine describes a “French will to 
will.”73 Walker understands that the elements “independence” and 
“activism” lead to an “interest in participating in the international 
community but on one’s own terms and without endangering a 
dependent relationship with any other country.”74 
 
(Potential) Presence. “France, the only West European nuclear power 
along with Great Britain, present on five oceans and four continents,” the 
Loi de Programmation Militaire for the years 1990-1993 prototypically 
formulates, “has chosen to ensure her security by herself to guarantee 
her independence and maintain her identity.”75 This (potential) presence 
NRC ingredient does not embody geographic limitations.76 “The French, 
von Weizsäcker remarks adamantly, “continue to produce their history 
as the accomplishment of a universal mission.”77 
 
France’s overseas départements (DOM), integral political-
administrative units of the “motherland,” and its other territorial 
holdings of different political-administrative statuses (TOM), corroborate 
this (potential) presence role component.78 The four overseas 
departments comprise two Caribbean islands (Guadeloupe, Martinique), 
a portion of South America (Guyane), and an island in the Indian Ocean 
(Réunion). Among others, France further possesses or controls New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia in the Pacific Ocean, Mayotte in the In-
dian Ocean, and the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off 
Newfoundland’s coast. “Confetti of the empire,” these splinters are 
leftovers of another institutional time.79 Yet, it is not the material 
possession or control of these quite costly territorial tenures that 
matters, but the role conception to which they contribute. 
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 “France has always understood itself as a globally acting middle 
power, which leads an ambitious foreign policy. Doing so, it does not 
evade frictions” with other states.80 And A.W. DePorte observes that the 
“Fifth Republic has pursued an active foreign policy in every part of the 
world and every sphere of international life.”81 
 
Another Normality’s Vocabulary: Greatness, Rank, Glory 
France’s role components, too, come with a vocabulary list, to which they 
are closely tied: greatness, rank, glory, and a few related terms. They are 
additional significant ingredients of a firmly anchored reference system 
contributing to the institutionalization of the role and purpose of a 
collective self. They are of a fundamentally different sort than those 
which are standard currency in Germany. 
 
Grandeur is perhaps the key term denoting the French NRC. 
Vernet even holds that the entire Gaullist foreign policy can be 
summarized with this single term.82 Maurice Vaïsse crisply titles his 
detailed study of French foreign policy between 1958 and 1969 “La 
Grandeur,”83 seconding Philip Cerny who wrote on Gaullist foreign policy 
under the heading “politics of greatness.”84 The notion of rang typically 
comes in formulations such as: France has to “take its rank,” France has 
to live up to its rank, or must “keep its rank.”85 It is a domestically rooted 
view of self that France occupy “a place in the front rank,”86 – “its tradi-
tional place in Europe and the world as a nation.”87 Vernet describes a 
sense of a French obsession with its own rank and role in the world.88 
 
André Malraux recalls that de Gaulle underscored, in one of the 
first guidelines he issued to those immediately surrounding him after his 
return in 1958, the necessity “to give back to France its nobility and its 
rank,”89 which the General considered neglected during the Fourth 
Republic years. Eleven years later, in December 1969, Malraux had a 
quiet personal talk with de Gaulle in his private domicile in Colombey, 
after the general’s conclusive farewell to politics. Malraux recalls that de 
Gaulle considered himself to have had “a contract with France” – with 
France, not with the French, as Malraux emphasizes. 90 The same theme 
persists, three presidents and thirty years later. Regarding France’s 
standing in Europe, Steven Kramer notes: “it was evident that neither 
                                                 
80 Vernet 1997a. 
81 DePorte 1991, 253. 
82 Vernet 1998b. 
83 Vaïsse 1998. 
84 Cerny 1986. 
85 Frank 1991, 68-69. 
86 DePorte 1991, 254. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Vernet 1992, 655, 663. 
89 Malraux 1971, 21. 
90 Ibid., 21-23. 
President Mitterrand, nor the political class would be satisfied with a 
second role for France”91 – with whatever consequences for interests, 
positions, and policies. 
 
Gloire, too, now probably the least common term of the three, 
intimately relates to France’s internally anchored view of its role and 
purpose in international matters. “Glory” is often employed when looking 
back at (the glory of) French history or the (glory of the) French army. 
Conceptual expressions of such legacies contribute to formulating 
challenges of the present and tasks for the future. 
 
Charles de Gaulle’s most celebrated and most often quoted text, 
next to his call of 18 June 1940, is the first few pages of his Mémoires de 
Guerre (L’Appel, 1940-1942).92 A conceptual abstract delineating 
France’s role, mission, and character, its key phrases and terms are in 
their own way a condensation of a self-categorization remaining valid 
today, even if de Gaulle’s pathos has (sometimes) gotten lost. They have 
been referred to as a matter of course, ever since L’Appel was first 
published. Already in the rhapsodic opening paragraph, after having 
formulated what has become the de Gaulle standard quote of all stan-
dard quotes (“… une certaine idée de la France”), de Gaulle states that 
“France cannot really be itself (elle-même) but in the first rank.” He 
concludes his introductory paragraph by exclaiming that “… our country, 
such as it is, … France cannot be France without greatness.”93 He then 
talks about “a sense of France’s dignity,” “a certain anxious pride 
regarding our country,” and about having been struck by the “the 
symbols of our glory.”94 Next to greatness, rank, and glory, such terms 
appear on L’Appel’s first three pages pertaining to France: dignity, pride, 
and prestige.95 
 
From Before to After de Gaulle 
“Probably the most important measure of the significance of Charles de 
Gaulle’s foreign and defense policies is the extent to which they 
generated a set of norms that have shaped French behavior of the past 
thirty-five years,” Cerny reflects. “It is primarily within France that those 
norms have retained their overall coherence and influence – symbolic 
and material – both for public perceptions of France’s proper role in the 
world and for the working of policymaking processes at elite level.”96 The 
chief constituents of this “national consensus”97 have endured.98 “The 
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foreign policy of the first septennat of François Mitterrand,” Rouget 
comments in 1989, “expresses in an almost perfect fashion how the Fifth 
Republic – independently of the party political orientations of its 
presidents – comprehends and practices continuity and constancy of 
France’s foreign relations.”99 “In foreign and security politics,” 
Nonnenmacher perceives, “only few outsiders are ready to question the 
basic orientations of the country as they came from de Gaulle.”100 De 
Gaulle “sets the terms of discourse about French foreign policy in ways 
that have persisted,” DePorte insists. And he “propounded ideas about 
the links between France’s internal life and its place in the world.”101 
This amounts to “a policy-generating insight into the relationship be-
tween the nation’s inner life, its essence as France, and its place in the 
politics of nations.”102 
 
Yet, de Gaulle invented neither the core tenets of a collective 
French self-view, nor a new foreign policy.103 The General took on 
historical raw materials and hammered out a set of basic orientations 
that would be consequential for French foreign and security policies. It 
was his achievement to find a common denominator for a range of 
reference points that were already present when he entered (and re-
entered) the scene, fusing them into a more or less coherent self-view of a 
social collectivity. 
 
In fact, major themes of France’s post-1958 NRC long predate de 
Gaulle. They come from other layers of historical time, and have deep 
roots in French history. For example, “defending the nation’s political 
independence, restoring France to its power and greatness and its 
universal mission” had already been among the principles set out during 
the Second World War by the national council of the Résistance (then, 
too, influenced by the General).104 Gordon, in his investigation of the 
impact of the Gaullist legacy on French foreign policy, recognizes that 
“Gaullist” policies and aspirations can be traced back to at least the 
Treaty of Versailles, if not to Napoleon and Louis XIV. Much that is 
“readily identified as ‘Gaullist’ in fact has roots that were clearly planted 
in the years that preceded the General’s return to power.”105 
                                                                                                                                                 
haps tend toward some reflexes of disinclination against the twentieth century’s yardstick. There 
is little doubt that the French NRC has included varying doses of anti-American sentiment as in-
gredients. “It was General de Gaulle himself,” Raymond Aron finds, “who gave his letters of nobil-
ity to anti-Americanism.” Aron 1983, 448-449. This, too, belongs to the General’s enduring heri-
tage. As Aron titled a 1974 Le Figaro article, tongue (only half) in cheek: “The Americans and us: 
Our closest adversaries.” Aron 1997 (1974), 1441-1444. 
99 Rouget 1989, 67. Further see, Gordon 1993, XV; Le Gloannec 1997. On the broad par-
ty consensus, see especially Sirjacques-Manfrass 1984, 72-73. 
100 Nonnenmacher 1999. 
101 DePorte 1991, 251. 
102 Ibid., 252. Emphasis in the original. 
103 Vernet 1998b. 
104 See Vernet 1992. Quote from 663. 
105 Gordon 1993, 4. Rainer Baums identifies still deeper historical foundations of some 
 
IV. Interests and Policies Induced: Franco-German Comparisons 
The elementary differences between France’s and Germany’s NRCs 
shape, via the three pathways of prescription, proscription, and process, 
French and German interests and policies across security issues areas. 
Security policies come in four layers: international order policies; alliance 
politics; military and deployment strategies; and force structure and 
armament policies. Interests and policies formulated on these four levels 
may be more or less coherently integrated.106 Since I want to show that 
NRCs find expression in a wide range of specific policies, I will only 
briefly consider the first two levels, security orders and alliances, and 
concentrate on policies of the last two levels.107 
 
Security Orders and Alliances 
“Pan-European peace order” (gesamteuropäische Friedensordnung): so 
Axel Sauder summarizes Germany’s order interests and policies.108 Since 
the Cold War days, German order policies have aimed at moving toward a 
pan-European net of interdependencies which would make belligerent 
behavior irrational and which would geographically encompass Europe 
and the North Atlantic area. These goals and their behavioral 
implications are not ad hoc products of the late 1980s, but reach back at 
least to NATO’s Harmel report of 1967. The phrase “gesamteuropäische 
Friedensordnung” first appeared in the 1960s.109 It has guided German 
order interests and policies ever since. Germany has, by and large, kept 
up this political design as an ultimate long-range goal, in spite of political 
difficulties, setbacks, and conflicts with some of its most important 
friends.110 Germany’s order policies have aimed at overcoming European 
divisions and including Eastern European states into the West’s security 
arrangements. Germany has sought to push ahead European 
integration, to counteract Europe-wide nationalization tendencies, and to 
increase both interstate and transnational cooperation, coordination, and 
association arrangements of most diverse kinds. Demarcating and 
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knitting together state power has been an important motive of these 
German order interests and policies.111 Germany’s pan-European order 
leanings have at times irritated France due to concerns that Germany 
might trade in its “anchoring in the West” for a comprehensive European 
order. 
 
German order and alliance policies over the last four decades have 
been both multilateral and integrationist.112 EU and NATO, 
supplemented by the OSCE and the WEU, have become Germany’s 
second nature when it comes to foreign policy. For both order and 
alliance policies, there is a German propensity toward what might be 
called “as well as” policies. That is, avoiding the sharp edges of difficult 
choices and insisting instead on non-choices; and attempting to make 
combinations of policy decisions that others frequently view as mutually 
exclusive. For example, in terms of both order and alliance orientations, 
Germany has always evaded the choice between the “United States and 
France,” or between the “North Atlantic area and Europe,” at times 
invited by Germany’s two most important allies. In the same spirit, 
Germany refused the choice between either a widening (Britain et al.) or a 
deepening (France et al.) of European integration as fallacious 
alternatives, and insisted on “as well as” policies: to push ahead on both 
fronts at once. Such interests and policies might have been born in a 
historical situation without alternatives. But a quickly internalized view 
of self turned them into stable products of widely shared role and 
purpose views. 
 
Changed external circumstances have only marginally affected 
German alliance interests. Its policies toward the EU have not altered 
qualitatively since the European eruptions of 1989-1991.113 Properly, 
German order and alliance policies have been termed “binding-in 
policies” (Einbindungspolitik).114 The actualization of Germany’s 
prescriptively NRC-induced order political and alliance interests are 
constitutionally facilitated by Grundgesetz article 24, which permits the 
federal government to transfer national sovereignty to international and 
supranational organizations, collective security arrangements, and inter-
national arbitration institutions by a simple law. In brief, Germany’s 
civilian power NRC finds expression in the state’s order and alliance 
interests and policies. These broad sets of interests and policies also 
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underscore how much it has become a Germany in Europe, rather than a 
Germany and Europe.115 For Germany, Robert Keohane and Stanley 
Hoffmann note, “international institutions have become intrinsically 
valuable,” positing that Germany’s order and alliance policies are also 
ends.116 As interests and policies, they result to a large extent from the 
shared “never on our own” and “legal framing-regularized conduct” core 
elements, and the central notions of responsibility, reliability, and 
continuity.117 
 
France, too, had never really accepted the “Yalta world.” 
Overcoming the “Yalta order” with its two superpowers, their dividing of 
Europe – often rendering it a mere object of the two powers on its fringes 
– had been, in broad terms, France’s guiding principle for its set of order 
interests and policies. Yet France’s goals have been all but congruent 
with Germany’s. For France, overcoming Yalta would ideally have meant 
establishing continental Europe (under France’s leadership) as a third 
actor on a par (or so) with the superpowers. Such a Europe could have 
more or less closely sided and cooperated with the United States. 
However, it would have been a Europe distinct and independent from the 
tutelage of the superpower to its west. Sauder names such a continental 
order beyond Yalta a “European confederation.”118 To be sure, these have 
been long-term French political order interests, at times difficult to keep 
up and sabotaged by adverse circumstances and the diverging interests 
of other European states (and the U.S., not to mention the Soviet Union). 
Yet, just as Germany’s order designs, they have not been ceded, either 
during the Cold War or after. 
 
Nonetheless, during the 1990s, France’s order goals have often 
remained fragmentary and vague in more concrete terms. All identifiable 
particles of order interests and policies, however, are strongly NRC-
guided. The state remains any order’s cornerstone, the nation its home. 
The European Union is to develop into an international political actor, 
while keeping the Union’s common foreign and security policies 
intergovernmental. In many ways, a more state-centered counter-model 
to Germany’s tighter and more comprehensive Europeanism, 
compromising external state autonomy, unless inevitable, is part of no 
French order design.119 Although lacking precision and concrete 
formulation as a coherent diplomatic project today, the Gaullist 
consensus remains the driving force behind French order interests and 
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policies. 
 
According to Raymond Aron, France’s leaving of NATO in 1966, 
preceded by pulling first France’s Mediterranean fleet, then its Atlantic 
fleet, out of the integrated NATO command, constitutes the epitome of 
Gaullist diplomacy.120 It springs from France’s goal of (at least symbolic) 
“total independence,” and its desire to elevate itself to great power status 
of global rank (rang mondial).121 It corresponds with its unwillingness to 
fully situate itself within one of the two blocs.122 Broadly speaking, 
France’s NRC proscribes full NATO integration, as that would encumber 
too much its independent formulation of strategic objectives and 
undermine the high degree of autonomy considered appropriate. 
The proscriptive and processual NRC effects may crystallize most 
clearly in France’s independent nuclear striking force, to be looked at 
below. This force and its deterrence doctrine serve an independent 
nation. It cannot be submerged into an integrated command. A small 
example from more than three decades after de Gaulle’s NATO exodus 
illustrates the persistently different French and German order and 
alliance reflexes: After Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac had disclosed 
the common Franco-German strategic concept after the Franco-German 
summit in Nuremberg in December 1996, communists and socialists in 
the French national assembly sharply criticized the paper for an alleged 
secret “Natoization” of French defense policy.123 Former Prime Minister 
Laurent Fabius warned against the danger of “subjugation under the 
USA.”124 Much in contrast, in Germany the paper was warmly welcomed 
as increasing and deepening security and defense cooperation with 
Germany’s most important partner.  
 
To be sure, French order and alliance interest and policies in no 
way rule out cooperation or even solidarity with other states. 
Compatibility yes, integration no. It is a cooperation that hinders less the 
ability to decide autonomously on a case by case basis, as well as 
increasing the potential opportunity costs of rupture. Frequently causing 
tensions and difficulties, France’s and Germany’s diverging order and 
alliance interests and policies have complicated Franco-German 
bilateralism. These interests and policies have, to name only one exam-
ple, decisively shaped their relations to NATO and the United States – 
one lasting difficulty in the Franco-German relationship. 125 
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Overall Force Structures, Mission Definitions, Deployment 
Armed forces are not only military, but also key security political 
instruments. “Force structure” is a telling policy domain documenting 
how a state prepares to act militarily, and how it plans to implement and 
actualize such actions. The German Bundeswehr is conceived as 
“alliance forces” (Bündnisarmee).126 Neither in terms of overall force 
structure, logistics, deployment options nor mission definitions is it 
designed to act other than in larger international coalitions. German 
forces are not organized, staffed, or equipped either for rapid unilateral 
deployment, or for independent performance of all important military 
tasks. They were born a NATO daughter and that they have remained. 
Their equipment has mainly been oriented toward the Bundeswehr’s role 
within NATO. Germany has not attempted to arm comprehensively. It 
has no interest in major unilateral power projection capabilities such as 
intermediate- or long-range missiles, or aircraft carriers. Interests as 
expressed in the force structure itself, and its deployment options and 
mission definitions, are fully in accordance with the shared “never on our 
own” NRC element, and the responsibility, reliability, and continuity 
notions. Such interests and policies have formed and been formulated 
via the prescription and processual causal pathways according to inter-
national law and together with Germany’s allies. 
 
During as after the Cold War, “the German Bundeswehr is to be 
employed abroad only within a multinational framework on the basis of a 
mandate of the United Nations and after thorough examination of each 
single case.” 127 The UN mandate ideal has been extended to NATO as 
tutor for German foreign involvement. It may be supplemented in the 
future by some collective EU action or within the OSCE frame. Until 
1990, the Bundeswehr has carried out more than 120 humanitarian 
missions abroad. These missions, prescriptively informed by the 
“responsibility” notion, have included the shipment of medication, food 
and other support for refugees of floods, earthquakes, and other catas-
trophes.128 Since 1990, the Bundeswehr has participated in NATO-led 
operations in former Yugoslavia, and has supported UNPROFOR and 
IFOR.129 It has continued to support UN-led humanitarian missions in 
Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, and East Timor.130 
 
Via all three pathways, prescription, proscription, and process, 
Germany’s NRC strongly affects German preferences and policies 
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regarding overall force structure, equipment and logistics, deployment 
options and mission definitions, and deployment itself. Equipping and 
staffing the forces for rapid unilateral deployment, and such deployment 
itself, are ruled out by its NRC’s proscriptive effects. German policies in 
all of these areas spring from a view of self and one’s role and purpose as 
a collectivity. They cannot be understood as mere results of power 
capabilities or domestic group interests. Nor do they result from external 
coercion. 
 
In striking contrast to Germany, France’s forces are 
comprehensively armed, corresponding to its residual world power NRC. 
French weapons include arms systems possessed only by the world’s 
leading military powers. France has self-developed and produced an 
entire native nuclear triad, including nuclear submarines as its crown 
jewels, and aircraft carriers as similarly elevated, costly, and prestigious 
weapons systems. Befitting the prescriptive and processual inducements 
of all three NRC core components – independence, activism and (po-
tential) presence – and in line with the “greatness” and “rank” notions, 
France kept during the second half of the twentieth century two aircraft 
carriers, Clemenceau and Foch. When the two had to be taken out of 
service around the turn of the century after problematically long periods 
of employment (Clemenceau some forty years, Foch slightly less), there 
was no political discussion regarding the assumption that France would 
replace them.  
 
To build the new cutting-edge aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle 
took eleven years. Its costs amounted to some FF 20 billion (not 
including the costs for the airplanes that it would carry; the high costs 
are the reason that France has only replaced one of the two old aircraft 
carriers). The 40,000-ton ship, with a length of 260 and a width of 64 
meters, will be staffed with some 2000 soldiers. It can carry forty Super-
Entendard and Rafale combat aircraft, both French productions. It is, 
next to the American aircraft carriers, the only one that may, thanks to 
its nuclear propulsion, remain at sea for up to five years without 
interruption.131 Very appropriately, the Süddeutsche Zeitung titles its 
report on the carrier’s first test voyage: “‘Charles de Gaulle’ – 
approaching the USA.”132 Whatever options the new carrier opens up, 
whatever strategic and tactical considerations Charles de Gaulle 
furnishes, it also is a simple statement that France, if it so desires and 
decides, can alone and independently of others be powerfully present 
anyplace in the world within a short period of time: if France so wishes, 
there is not a square centimeter of land or sea on this globe whereto 
France could not project power, and which it could not attack with the 
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aircraft that the new carrier can transport. 
 
French forces are structured to provide deployment options and 
mission definitions to project power and military force unilaterally, 
independently, and without geographic limitations. They are designed to 
enable France’s political leadership to strike rapidly and independently 
from others, (almost) anywhere. With all implications regarding logistics 
and equipment, France’s NRC induces a processual interest and policies 
fostering the capacity to act independently, and to safeguard the option 
to act independently. Unlike Germany’s, France’s NRC does not proscribe 
interests and policies toward unilateral and independent international 
action that includes military force. Instead, it prescribes such interests 
and policies. It proscribes policies that would undermine this capacity.  
 
During the Cold War, French troops have not been integrated into 
NATO’s doctrine of “forward defense” (i.e. attempting to stop a Warsaw 
Pact attack at the German-German border). Instead, France operated 
with contingency plans that entailed a concept of “two battles.” This 
meant that France might only have participated in the European theater 
after NATO’s forward defense had already collapsed and French territory 
was immediately threatened. The “two battles concept,” still not yet fully 
buried by the mid-1980s, did not necessarily exclude French support for, 
most notably, Germany and thus indirectly for NATO. But there was no 
such automatism. Fourth and Fifth Republic France has regularly taken 
recourse to the unilateral deployment of military force as a matter of 
course if it saw fit, such as in the Central African Republic (1967-1969) 
and in Chad (1968-1971). It has also fought two large colonial wars since 
1945, Indo-China (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962). Since 1990 it 
has participated in collective military operations and often taken over 
most violent, dangerous, and demanding military operations (e.g. 
Sarajevo). 
 
Nuclear Striking Force 
The two countries’ postures toward a native nuclear striking force 
(including deterrence and deployment doctrine) is perhaps paradigmatic 
of the effects of fundamentally divergent NRCs in engendering radically 
different interests and policies. For France it is normal, natural, and 
intuitively plausible to possess a nuclear force, and to independently 
formulate a deterrence and deployment doctrine for it. For Germany it is 
just as normal, natural, and intuitive not to have nuclear arms. In both 
countries, these normalities are not politicized. If France is obsessed with 
its force de frappe, as some observers occasionally suggest, Germany is 
obsessed with its nuclear pacifism. 
 
The “naturalness” of both normalities is particularly striking, as, 
especially during the Cold War, it was all but evident that either nuclear 
stance would increase the two countries’ security. Whether France’s 
independent nuclear force, including deterrence doctrine, increased 
France’s security (or even decreased it) has been a hotly debated issue 
among nuclear strategists.133 Conversely, the credibility problems of 
NATO-US’s extended deterrence covering West Germany (“risking New 
York for Berlin?”) was one of the lasting strenuous transatlantic German-
American Cold War issues. The NRC-induced nuclear positions have 
brought about frictions and difficulties in the Franco-German re-
lationship. On the one hand, the wider ramifications of the nuclear issue, 
important in co-defining each state’s relationship with NATO, has been a 
persistent obstacle for a more substantive moving together in security 
and defense matters between the two states. On the other hand, France’s 
pre-strategic (in NATO parlance: tactical) doctrine of “ultimate warning” 
(ultime avertissement) has diametrically opposed Germany’s interest in 
deferring the use of nuclear weapons as long as possible. Moreover, the 
French pre-strategic nuclear weapons (Pluto, then Hadès) were of such a 
range that, if fired eastward, they would have detonated on German 
territory. The issue accompanied France and Germany until the Cold 
War’s end. 
 
France had during the Cold War built for itself a complete “nuclear 
triad” consisting of missiles, nuclear submarines, and airplanes that can 
carry nuclear warheads. Possession and doctrinal assignment originate 
in the prescriptive and processual effects of its NRC’s independence 
component, and its “greatness” and “rank” notions.134 For Rouget it is 
evident that interests in the national nuclear military capacity derive 
from the notion of “independence.”135 That notion generates, Karl 
Feldmeyer spells out, the need for French interests and policies to be 
able to defend itself or to deter third parties from attacking France 
independently from others – as, for example, then Defense Minister Che-
vènement repeatedly underlined.136 “Regarding our nuclear forces,” 
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas clarifies, “their independence rules out 
considering them as an subgroup of the American ones.”137 Perhaps 
General Ailleret’s 1967 nuclear deterrence doctrine “in all directions”138 
constitutes the somewhat capricious culmination of France’s nuclear 
policies – hardly explainable by threat imbalances “from all directions.” 
Scott Sagan finds the same causes at work: “The repeated Gaullist 
declarations that French nuclear weapons should have world-wide 
capabilities and must be aimed in all directions (“tous azimut”) are seen, 
not as the product of security threats that came from all directions, but 
rather because only such a policy could be logically consistent with 
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global grandeur and independence.”139 Urs Leimbacher identifies a deeply 
political dimension in France’s defense doctrine: “It embodies a reason of 
state (Staatszweck).”140 
 
During the same time, Germany has not considered the idea of 
acquiring its own nuclear arms. The reasons for not doing so are not that 
they had been externally denied to the state, or been considered too 
resource-demanding at home. Its NRC’s proscriptive effects have ruled 
out interests in such forces and made acquisition policies barely 
conceivable.141 The persistence of French and German nuclear attitudes 
after the end of the Cold War and Germany’s second unification 
strengthens the argument. As has been the case before, the German 
interest not to have nuclear arms remains uncontested today. 
Assembling a native nuclear arsenal remains inconceivable across the 
German political spectrum. Some speculations in American academia 
notwithstanding, there is no evidence whatsoever that Germany is in the 
process of changing its stance toward nuclear weapons. The reason 
seems trivial: nobody within Germany wants a change in policy. France’s 
basic nuclear orientations have changed just as little. Two states 
geographically so close and so similar in many ways have quite deviating 
interests regarding a native nuclear striking force. Their NRCs explain 
the variation. 
 
Arms Procurement, Arms Production, Arms Industry 
French and German NRCs also shape their arms procurement and 
production policies, and the two states’ relations to their arms industries. 
France has striven to be able to self-supply its forces with the entire 
range of weapons systems it sees fit for a power with ambitions of a 
global presence. That undertaking has included indigenous development 
and production of such highly sophisticated and demanding systems as 
a nuclear triad and aircraft carriers. France’s arms procurement and 
production policies are little contested domestically. They result from 
France’s NRC core components and notions along the prescriptive causal 
pathway. Dagmar Trefz plainly concludes that French arms procurement 
and production is a function of its “independence” propensity.142 Walther 
Stützle elaborates that this “independence self-understanding” in par-
ticular sparks France’s interest to have at its disposal an armament 
industry that is independent from the United States.143 “As a result of de 
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Gaulle’s defense doctrine aiming at independence,” Gerald Braunberger 
notes elementary differences between French and German interests and 
priorities, “France owns an armament industry that can manufacture 
from aircraft carriers, nuclear warheads, combat airplanes, tanks, heavy 
artillery, almost all military equipment up to the last screw in national 
production.”144 Accordingly, the French armament industry has been, 
with differing legal statuses, state-owned or state-controlled. Some 
weapons factories have been state-owned since the eighteenth century. 
France has only recently begun to privatize parts of its arms industry. 
 
The contrast with German interests and policies is again striking. 
As an NRC-induced processual interest, buying abroad, producing under 
license, or co-developing and producing with “partners” or “friends” is not 
only common practice, but taken as something generally beneficial. 
There is no attempt to cover the entire spectrum of modern arms with 
domestic products. Questions of technological independence and 
symbolic pride in the capability to produce any or certain weapon 
systems, so important for France, are German non-issues. Rather, the 
opposite tends to be the case: sensing apparent tendencies toward too 
much military-technological unilateralism and comprehensive arming, 
not only within Germany but within the group of Germany’s military 
partners at large, a Bonn-based research group warns that the “all-
around arming of single partner countries is in the first place a sign of 
mistrust that urgently needs to be overcome.”145 Arms manufacturing 
may not exactly be a repressed branch of German industrial prowess. 
Yet, the arms industry also does not enjoy much legitimacy with its 
particularistic interests, either within the government, or within the 
population at large. “In particular,” Leimbacher points out, “Bonn does 
not exercise public industrial- or technology policies through the arms 
industry.”146 “A maximum of defense-industrial self-sufficiency (and) 
autarky remains to the French, what it has not been to the Germans,” 
David Haglund summarizes, “a virtue, even if an unattainable one in 
practice.”147 
 
Arms Export 
French and German self-defined public arms export policies differ. Since 
the two states have co-developed and produced a number of arms 
systems, arms export issues have frequently surfaced and caused 
irritations. When it comes to selling the joint products abroad, their 
NRC-induced interests clash frequently. With respect to a major Franco-
German combat helicopter project under way, for example, and France 
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pushing its interest in technical properties that would make the 
helicopter more marketable abroad, CDU armament expert Willy Wimmer 
once remarked without attempting to hide his deprecation: “The French 
only fly what also can fly in the South American pampas.”148 
 
The responsibility notion of Germany’s civilian power NRC exerts 
powerful proscriptive and processual impact on the state’s restrictive 
arms export policies. It implies a sense of accountability for what 
purposes and by whom the arms it has produced will be employed. 
Germany does not export arms into “tension areas” (Spannungsgesbiete), 
to regimes whose human rights records it deems unsatisfactory or 
questionable, to destinations where it can reasonably be expected that 
German arms may be utilized in transgression of international law, or, 
finally, to governments which may use the arms against its own people. 
Germany does not hesitate to export arms to stable democracies with 
impeccable human rights records such as its “partners and friends” 
within the EU and NATO and a number of other states. Not surprisingly, 
there is a large gray area where it is not quickly and intuitively evident 
whether or not to export. Whether responsibility permits in specific cases 
to export or not is a regularly recurrent issue in German domestic 
politics. Borderline cases are difficult political issues which regularly 
instigate spirited domestic political debate. They are part of a German 
political normality. For example, the issue whether German Leopard-2 
tanks could be sold to Turkey was a fierce political issue that for the first 
time threatened the continuation of the SPD-Green coalition after two 
years in power, illustrating the processual effect toward a slow incremen-
talist mode of interest formation and policy formulation. 149 
 
Whereas for Germany exporting arms is a highly sensitive matter, 
for France, with no proscriptive NRC forces at work, selling arms is an 
acceptable business practice. If there is an NRC effect on the matter, 
arms sales as policies are welcomed, as they display the nation’s 
technological and industrial capability. The international sale of 
homemade arms confirms the competitiveness of French products on 
world markets. Selling arms is an intuitively plausible interest for an 
active-independent collectivity with ambitions of global presence. Just as 
in Germany there is a broad consensus regarding the normality of re-
strictive handling of arms exports, in France there is a broad consensus 
that selling arms abroad is a normal and legitimate source of income. 
Moreover, the practice often directly benefits the public budget, as most 
of the defense industry has been publicly owned or controlled.  
 
In France, the arms industry has traditionally played an important 
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and respected role. It belongs, Gerhard Bläske records, “next to 
agriculture and tourism, to the most important providers of foreign 
currency.”150 Unlike Germany, France sells to whomever pays. Behind 
the United States and Great Britain, it has ranked the world’s third 
largest exporter of arms and military goods. In 1997 it sold abroad in a 
volume of some 30 billion French francs.151 Arms sales are an important 
contribution to France’s ability to keep up the comprehensive armament-
related components of its domestic industrial structure.152 French 
customers have included not only regimes with – for German standards – 
unacceptable human rights records and states in “tension areas,” but 
also states charged and treated as international outlaws or “rogue states” 
– an expression of independence and autonomy of decision of its own 
kind. 153 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
National role conceptions are nominal variables, coded by empirically 
extracting the major elements and notions that make them up. The 
differences between the French and German NRCs are deep. Their NRCs’ 
vocabularies underscore this variation in substance. In this sense, Picht 
is correct in his statement, quoted above, that the Carolingian inheritors 
in many respects speak different languages. Yet, they do live in the same 
world. Their dissimilar self-understandings and views of their proper role 
and purpose in international affairs are a part of it. 
 
NRCs shape national interests and foreign policies. They are 
internal reference systems which affect what states want and do, and 
what they do not want and do not do; they prescribe, proscribe, and 
induce certain processual preferences. Their dissimilar NRCs inform 
variant, often incompatible and conflicting, French and German security, 
defense, and armament policies. These policies are “the product of an 
entirety of contradictory reflections emanating from both sides of the 
Rhine on the role and the ‘rank’ of France and of Germany.”154 
 
NRC-induced interests and policies are often taken as normal, 
natural, and intuitive within the respective country, as are the substance 
and notions of the respective NRCs themselves. “That which is taken for 
granted” is what culture is all about, Elizabeth Kier remarks.155 Within 
Germany, much of Germany’s proper role and purpose in the world, and 
what follows therefrom for German interests and policies, is taken for 
granted. Within France, much of France’s proper role and purpose in the 
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world, and what follows therefrom for French interests and policies, is 
taken for granted. For most Germans and French, neither is amazing 
and neither is strange. That the same cannot often be said when French 
and Germans look at each other’s views of role and purpose with their 
consequences for their respective goals and actions, is not a new finding. 
Elsewhere, other standards of what is normal are normal. 
 
Two issues remain to be addressed. The first concerns NRCs in 
relation to other factors of national interest and foreign policy. The 
second refers to the prospects of endurance and change of the French 
and German NRCs and their effects. 
 
NRCs among Other Determinants of Interest and Policy 
How do NRCs relate to other factors of national interest and foreign 
policy, whether constructivist or rationalist? NRCs are domestic social-
structural explanatory factors. Employed by themselves, as in this paper, 
they may provide answers to a certain set of political and historical 
analytic problems. Searching their scope conditions and areas of 
applicability, one may continue testing “how much mileage” one can get 
out of NRCs properly coded, how much explanatory leverage they 
provide, and where they reach their limits. 
 
NRCs are an internal element of state and national identity. Yet, 
they do not exhaust identity. On the one hand, there are other internal-
domestic features, most notably institutional characteristics of the 
political system. They, too, may condition interests, but also regulate the 
access of organized society’s interests to political power centers – and are 
an important aspect of state identity.156 On the other hand, there are 
external-relational identity attributes which affect interests and 
policies.157 In this way, NRCs can be viewed as part of a constructivist-
institutionalist research agenda. As such, they may be combined with 
other factors favored by such approaches, either domestic or external-
relational-systemic. Although a major component of identity, NRCs alone 
cannot provide complete explanations of national interests and foreign 
policies. 
 
NRCs’ possible relation to variables favored by rationalist theories 
of international relations or foreign policy are not uniform. In some 
respects, NRCs can be thought of as complementary with realist theories. 
Regarding structural realism,158 they might mediate states’ responses to 
similar systemic pressures, or specify policies-as-answers to external 
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stimuli. Regarding classic and “state-centric” realisms, they might 
contribute to a better understanding of the kinds of goals, types of 
ambitions, and purposes of projections to which available power 
resources are deployed.159 However, if NRC-induced interests and 
policies contradict those derived from realist theories, the two 
approaches will offer competitive explanations to be adjudicated 
empirically. The same will be generally the case if NRC work is an 
integrative part of a more comprehensive constructivist-institutionalist 
research program, which would operate with another ontology and 
another conceptualization of the international sphere. 
 
Although they might causally push in the same direction, NRC and 
inside-out liberal explanations are often competitive: here shared role-
purpose understandings, there particularistic interests of interest 
groups, firms, individuals approaching their government.160 In such 
instances, features of the political system or societal organization might 
provide intermediary variables determining which matters more and 
which less. But there are other ways, too, to think of the connection 
between NRC and liberal perspectives. For example, the one may be a 
frame for the other: NRCs might set a frame and define limits and 
borders for the legitimacy of particularistic interests once entering the 
political machinery. Alternatively, NRCs might be influential when 
domestic groups develop their interests in the first place. Or NRC and 
liberal modes of argument might be intricately intertwined in other ways. 
 
With respect to neoliberal institutionalism,161 NRCs could 
contribute to defining interests and efficiencies to be pursued 
internationally, either alone or as part of a theory of domestic politics. In 
this case, what just has been said about inside-out liberalism applies. 
Which of these relationships pertains, depends on the research problem 
or analytic focus. These conceivable relations among factor groups are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive and defy a general answer. One must 
learn about them through detailed empirical study, not abstract de-
historicized reasoning. In the absence of a general assessment, the 
relationship must be decided pragmatically on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Endurance, Change, Transformation 
How likely is it that the French and German post-war role conceptions 
and their resulting effects will persist in the time ahead? Fairly stable 
between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s, as this article has held, to 
what degree are they in a process of change at the turn of the century? 
None of the French NRC’s core components appears to alter 
fundamentally. Nor do the role’s key notions appear to mutate or 
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disappear. However, although NRCs help to define plausible fund 
allocation and cost calculation, conflicts between NRC and available re-
sources keep France from fully translating domestically shared purpose 
into foreign policy. This tension might bear the seeds of change. For 
France, directing power and channeling its projection is also a question 
of how much of its own ambitious role’s costly demands it is willing to 
afford. The allocation of resources toward the ends of an exigent NRC will 
remain a difficult French political issue. As few indications suggest that 
France’s NRC will radically transform in the near future, its enormous 
costs continue to torment the viability of the role itself.162 
 
For Germany, realizing its NRC’s exigencies is hardly confined by 
capability scarcity. Yet, the German case is intricate.163 The “never on 
our own” and “legal framing” NRC elements, as I have described them, 
remain at the center of German self-comprehension. But especially in the 
wake of the atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo, German understandings 
with respect to the admissible and appropriate exercise of military force, 
painfully and grudgingly, appear to evolve. The modification seems 
accompanied by embracing a somewhat more active role in international 
affairs, and, as some observers perceive, an at times more assertive style. 
Furthermore, Germany’s proper international security role now appears 
more contested in domestic politics than it has been for some time. 
 
Two factors in particular might foster German NRC adaptations in 
the medium term. The first concerns the demands by those states with 
which Germany is most closely tied. Perhaps it is an irony of Europe’s 
history that it is now repeatedly Germany’s “partners and friends,” often 
France, who push Germany to take on “more international 
responsibility,” to play a more “active” part internationally, to modify 
some of its civilian power elements, or to bend their effects. The second 
factor is ongoing generational changes within Germany with respect to 
key public positions. In addition, the events and repercussions of Sep-
tember 11 could have catalytic effects on German role modification. 
These events have shaken German self-understanding, more than that of 
others.  
 
Still, even if Germany adapts its attitudes toward the use of 
military force in some situations and takes on a more active international 
role, the question remains: in which cases, under what conditions, and 
to what ends. World War II and the Holocaust are likely to remain 
constitutive of how Germans think of themselves and their role in the 
world. The political debates at the turn of the century revolve around 
what these historical legacies mean, and what they imply for Germany in 
the international arena today. How and to what degree these factors will 
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modify the German NRC, and whether seemingly ongoing adaptations are 
harbingers of deeper transformations, is as difficult to predict as it is 
important to follow. However, the comparative perspective of these 
considerations highlights that the roots of possible NRC change can be 
quite disparate. 
 
In the wake of dissimilar historical experiences and in light of 
different potential  impulses of change, at the beginning of a new century 
both French and Germans are searching for the selves of their 
collectivities and pondering the proper roles of these collectivities in 
Europe and the world. “Continuity or change,” both with respect to self-
view and its expression in policy, might not be the most appropriate way 
to frame the issue. Rather “continuity within change” or “change within 
continuity,” or perhaps “legacy-guided change” seem more fruitful ways 
of thinking about such processes of self-(re)definition with behavioral 
implications. If NRC elements in one or both countries indeed are in the 
course of mutation, the respective NRC’s substance of the past forty 
years will strongly condition these processes. And these processes will 
take time. This judgment leads one to expect continued differences in 
French and German foreign policies, as well as frictions between the two. 
However, depending on the direction of change, potential transformations 
of one or both NRCs might also make the bilateral Franco-German 
relationship less problematic. Should Germany’s self-view turn less “civil” 
or France’s turn less “world power,” tensions and misunderstandings 
between the two might very well diminish, both in frequency and 
intensity. 
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